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WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE: SCIENCE AND POLICY AT
ODDS IN THE REGULATION OF VIRGINIA'S PRIVATE

FORESTS
2
MICHAEL J. MORTIMER', HARRY L. HANEY, JR., AND

JONATHAN J. SPINK

3

The regulation of forestry practices in the Commonwealth of
Virginia has recently been in flux. While current statewide forestry
regulations are relatively innocuous and stable, particularly when
compared to the sweeping forest practice acts of California or
Oregon, the local ordinances in Virginia remain few and scattered.4
Nonetheless, it appears that times may be changing.5 Local
governments are very much interested in increasing their respective
roles in the regulation of forestry within their respective
jurisdictions, 6 particularly in the wake of the Dail v. York County7
decision two years ago. This decision made it less likely that local
governments will be constrained in the issuance of forestry-related
ordinances.
Why the concern with forests and forest regulations in
Virginia? The answer lies in the value and nature of forest ownership
in Virginia. Nearly half a million private forest landowners control
approximately eighty-seven percent, or 13.4 million acres, of the 15.4
million acres of commercial forestland in the Commonwealth.8
'Michael 1.Mortimer, J.D, Ph.D. is an Assistant Professor of Forest Law and Policy
in the Department of Forestry at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, and a
former Assistant Attorney General for the State of Montana. The authors gratefully
acknowledge funding from the USDA Forest Service, Southern Research Station, New Orleans,
La. supporting this research.
2Harry L. Haney, Jr., Ph.D. is the Garland Gray Professor of Forestry in the
Department of Forestry at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
3Jonathan J. Spink was previously a graduate research assistant in the Department of
Forestry at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.
'Jonathan J. Spink, Survey and Analysis of Forestry-Related Regulations in the
Southern United States, (2001) (unpublished master's thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and
State University). The author points out that a recent study surveying Virginia counties and
municipalities revealed that there are currently twenty-one different sets of local forest
management ordinances, and that the vast majority of local municipalities do not have in place
any type of forestry management regulations.
'See U.S. FOREST SERVICE, U. S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., S. FOREST RESOURCE
ASSESSMENT, SOCIO-3, 48, 72 (2001) [hereinafter SOCIO-3] The actual number of forest
management regulations in Virginia rose from forty-four in 1992 to seventy-seven in 2000,
while across the southern United States such regulations more than doubled during the same
period.
6
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Silvicultural Practices (2001).
'528 S.E.2d 447 (Va. 2000).
'Thomas W. Birch et al., Characterizing Virginia's Private Forest Owners and
Their Forest Lands, USDA FOREST SERVICE, NE RESEARCH STATION, RESEARCH PAPER NE-

J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L,

[VOL. 17:1

These lands directly contribute $1.3 billion annually to the economy
of Virginia, while the overall use and value of the Commonwealth's
forest resources contribute $30.5 billion annually. 9 Timber products
remain the most valuable agricultural cash crop in Virginia, returning
more than $345 million to the Commonwealth's private landowners
annually, to

Within this economic and demographic context, the effects of
regulating forest landowners and their role in the economy is
apparent, since any forestry regulation tends to have direct and
constrictive impacts on property rights. Compliance can burden the
landowner with extra costs, reducing the economic value of the
land."' Specific types of regulations will be discussed later in this
article, but, in summary, it has become more common for regulations
to stray from traditional police power restrictions, such as
reforestation, and focus instead upon production of public benefits
such as aesthetics and wildlife habitat. The latter regulations, which
place higher burdens on the landowner and return uncertain benefits
overturned than do the
to the public, run a higher risk 1of
2 being
historic types of forest regulations.
Fortunately, protection of private property rights from undue
governmental interference is couched within federal and state
constitutions.1 3 The federal guarantees against government takings
provided by the Fifth Amendment, and applied to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment, are largely duplicated in the Virginia
Constitution. The Virginia legislature affords broader protection for

707 AT 1 (1998).
9
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'old. Based upon 1999 data.

"Paul V. Ellefson & Patrick D. Miles, Protecting Water Quality in the Midwest:
Impact on Timber Harvesting Costs, 2 N. J. APPLIED FORESTRY 57 (1985); Peter Lickwar et al.,
Costs of Protecting Water Quality DuringHarvesting on Private Forestlands in the Southeast,
16 S.I. APPLIED FORESTRY 13 (1992); Harry L. Haney, Jr. & David A. Cleaves, Potential Cost
of ForestryRegulation in the South, 1992 FOREST FARMER 8; Laurie J. Hawks et al., Forest
Water Quality Protection: A Comparison of Regulatory and Voluntary Programs, 91 J.

FORESTRY 48 (1993); Russell K. Henley et al., State Regulation of Private Forest Practices:
What accomplishments at What Costs? 13 W. WILDLANDS 23 (1988); SOCIO-3, supra note 5.

'2See generally, H.D. Warren, Constitutionality of Reforestation or Forest
Conservation Legislation, 13 A.L.R. 2d 1095 (1950).

Forest regulation of private property has

historically focused upon questions of reforestation. These "seed tree laws" stemmed in large
part from late nineteenth and early twentieth century fears of timber shortages, and "cut and
run" tactics on both private and public lands. For example, in State v. Dexter, 202 P.2d 906,
908 (Wash. 1949),judgment affirmed 338 U.S. 863, (1949), the court noted that: Fifteen years
ago we commented upon the problem of our vanishing forests and the problems of reforestation
of the vast areas of our state from which the timber had already been removed, and the
necessity of planting 'denuded areas, to remedy, in part at least, the wasteful practices of the

past. [Citation omitted].

13U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV; VA. CONST., art. 1, § 1.
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the landowner, however, by allowing two kinds of actions: takings
takings.14
claims for complete takings and damage claims for partial
To obtain redress from either a complete taking or damages
from a partial taking under the Virginia Constitution forest
landowners must satisfy a number of requirements. In elucidating
these requirements several Virginia cases have recently addressed the
specifics under which they are available.' 5 Perhaps of greater import,
16
the United States Supreme Court in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
recently altered the mechanics of how and when a compensated
taking may be redressed. Palazzolo contradicted the Virginia
Supreme Court's prior holdings on regulatory takings, specifically,
the damage claims. 17 In light of this Supreme Court decision, forest
owners have increased hope for compensation since Pazazzolo
expands the class of landowners who qualify for damage claims.
Consequently, local governments wishing to increase their regulation
of private forestlands are likely to encounter courts that are more
willing to label their actions as damage, thus necessitating
compensation under the Virginia Constitution.
Part I of this article will address the current state of regulatory
takings in Virginia, focusing on the most recent developments with
the Virginia Supreme Court. Part II will discuss Palazollo's impact
on the state of regulatory takings claims in Virginia. Part III will
examine how the takings question fits with Virginia forest regulation
and the resultant effects on forest landowners. Finally, Part IV will
present several policy issues revolving around forest regulation,
private property ownership, and environmental concerns in Virginia.
PART I
Inverse condemnation, or regulatory takings, are terms used
to describe the government enactment of a regulation whose terms
and conditions diminish or eliminate the value of private property
subject to that regulation.'8 Noted historical examples include such
prohibitions as bans on development adjacent to a body of water.' 9
141d.
15
See Lambert v. City of Norfolk, 61 S.E. 776 (Va. 1908); Bd. of Supervisors of
Prince William County v. Omni Homes, Inc., 481 S.E.2d 460 (Va. 1997)[hereinafter Omni
Homes); City of Virginia Beach v. Bell, 498 S.E.2d 414 (Va. 1998) [hereinafter Bell].
6533 U.S. 606 (2001).
171d.

'tPaul V. Ellerson & Patrick D. Miles, Protecting Water Quality in the Midwest:
Impact on Timber HarvestingCosts, 2 N. J. APPLIED FORESTRY 57 (1985).

"9Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (involving
construction restrictions on beachfront property) [hereinafter Lucas]; Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 606
(developing beachfront property); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'd 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (stating requirements for development
in watersheds feeding Lake Tahoe).
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Regulatory takings are distinguished from physical takings, in that
there is no physical occupation or possession of the property by the
government condemner. 20 Rather, the effects are indirect, impacting
property values and incidents of ownership. 2'
An enormous body of case law and academic discussion has
developed over the course of the last fifteen years in response to the
inherent difficulties of fashioning appropriate legal tests to determine
when a taking has been triggered, and when triggered, appropriate
remedies. 22 These discussions, however, have largely focused on the
federal takings clause, what it guarantees, and its various applications
to state regulatory situations.
At the state level, jurisprudence and scholarly discussion have
been somewhat limited due to the vagaries of state constitutions.
Within the last several years, however, the Virginia Supreme Court
addressed regulatory takings claims from the perspective of the
Virginia Constitution.23 The Virginia Constitution provides a greater
level of protection to private property by virtue of the following
language:
... No person shall be deprived of his life, liberty
or property without due process of law; that the
General Assembly shall not pass any law
impairing the obligation of contracts, nor any law
whereby private property shall be taken or
damaged for public
uses, without just
compensation, the term "public
uses" to be
24
defined by the General Assembly.
This enhanced protection provides opportunities to challenge
regulations that eliminate something less than the entire amount or
scope of the property's value.
This tenet has been well recognized by the Virginia judiciary.
In 1908, for example, the Virginia Supreme Court undertook an
analysis of the damage clause of the 1902 constitution. The court held
that, when rights appurtenant to the use and enjoyment of private
property were abrogated, a public taking resulted.25 In other words:

2°Lucas. 505 U.S. at 1015-16.
2
22See id.
See generally Robert Meltz et a, THE TAKINGS ISSUE (1999).
23
See Lambert, 61 S.E. at 776; Omni Homes, 481 S.E. 2d at 460; Bell, 498 S.E. 2d at
414.

24VA. CONST., art. 1,§ 11(emphasis added).
25Lambert, 61 S.E. at 776.
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A direct, special injury must depreciate the value
These elements
of the owner's property.
"concurring" his property is damaged within the
meaning of the constitutional amendment; and to
the extent of such diminished value, beyond
damages sustained by the public at large from the
improvement, the property owner is under the
entitled
to
constitutional 26 amendment
compensation.
The Lambert court emphasized that private property could
indeed be damaged by the acts of municipal governments without
compensation prior to the enactment of this particular provision of
For over a century, courts have
the 1902 Constitution.27
acknowledged that the Virginia Constitution provides a landowner
with compensation, in the event of "damage" or devaluation of
private property, to a far greater degree than that required by the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the United States
Constitution.
However, questions remain as to the implementation of the
constitutional guarantee in specific situations. For example, under
what factual and procedural circumstances can a landowner claim
that a regulation has devalued his property, such that compensation is
forthcoming? Fortunately, nearly a century after Lambert, the
Virginia Supreme Court appears to have settled many of these
questions. In 1997, the court determined the merits of a dispute
between Prince William County and a private residential developer in
Omni Homes.28 Faced primarily with a Fifth Amendment claim
under the United States Constitution, the court nonetheless addressed
takings and damage claims brought under the Virginia Constitution.29
The court rejected the state takings claim due to the disputed
regulation's failure to deprive the plaintiffs property of all economic
value. As for the damage claim, the court determined that the
plaintiff's developmental right had not been damaged. 30 The plaintiff
was denied recovery for damages, but only because the Court found
no detrimental impacts to the plaintiffs property. 3' By not rejecting
the possibility of damage compensation, the court reiterated the

26

1d. at 779.
777.
Omni Homes, 481 S.E.2d 460 (Va. 1997).
29
"Id. at
28
1d

3

id. at 476.

Mid.
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damage guarantee provided by Article I, § 11 of the Virginia
Constitution."
Omni Homes settled most inverse condemnation principles as
to both the takings question and the damages question. One major
question remained unresolved: how does the timing of the offending
regulation affect the right or ability to claim a complete or partial
taking? In other words, does a party's purchase/inheritance of
property subsequent to promulgation of regulation affect his ability to
claim damages? The Virginia Supreme Court addressed that question
the following year in a regulatory takings case involving wetland
development.33 The court, applying the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Lucas, 34 determined that the timing of the takings
claim in relation to the timing of promulgation was a crucial question.
The court focused on whether or not the injured landowner had
acquired the property subsequent to the enactment of the offending
regulations. Finding that a regulation preceding purchase barred a
takings claim, the court held:
[T]he restriction on the lots was in the chain of
title at the time of the [plaintiff] Bell's acquisition
and likewise when Bell and his wife deeded the
property to the Bell Land Trust. Thus, Bell, and
now the Trustee, acquired the property with full
knowledge35of the risk involved in attempting to
develop it.
This rationale suggested that the property could not logically
have been taken, since the complaining landowner had never actually
held the property right he now claimed was diminished. In other
words, a landowner cannot miss what he never had.
The court then appended a timing requirement to Virginia's common
law of inverse condemnation, which is summarized graphically in
Figure 1 below:

32

d.
See Bell, 498 S.E.2d 414 (Va. 1998).
34
35Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Bell, 498 S.E.2d at 419.
33
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Figure 1.The effect of timing requirements on Virginia's law of inverse condemnation.

At least one commentator disagrees with this assessment of
Omni Homes, claiming instead that the Virginia Supreme Court has,
to date, refrained from addressing a damage claim as illustrated
above.36 The disagreement alleges that the court explicitly chose to
avoid addressing the partial takings or damage issue in the Omni

Homes case, and therefore, the issue remains obscure or narrowly
interpreted.37 That argument, however, misinterprets the Omni Homes
holding. To the contrary, the court specifically addressed Article 1
saying that:
Property is damaged for Virginia constitutional
purposes when an appurtenant right connected
with the property is directly and specially affected
by a public use and that use inflicts a direct and
special injury on the property which diminishes its
value.38

The court's holding clarifies that, for a damage claim, the
abrogation of only one property right is necessary, and that the loss
need not be total as is required for a takings claim. 39 Failure to
recognize or accept the implications of this holding denies the
potential effects this decision could have on local regulation.
In summary, Virginia's Constitution and courts have
recognized three elemental principles: (1) that private property may
be damaged by public laws and regulation; (2) that such damage,
under certain circumstances, is compensable; and (3) that a
landowner, with knowledge of the law or regulation prior to
3

6Gifford R. Hampshire, Regulatory Takings with a Virginia Focus? EMINENT
25 (1998).
371d.
3
'Omni Homes, 481 S.E.2d 460, 467 (Va. 1997) (citing City of Lynchburg v. Peters,
157 S.E. 769,
39 772 (Va. 1931).
0mni Homes, 481 S.E.2d at 460.

DOMAIN-STATE AND FEDERAL, A VIRGINIA LAWYER'S PRACTICE HANDBOOK,
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acquiring the property, cannot later allege damage in the face of the
regulations.
PART II

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,40 was the culmination of cases
brought by a land developer in Rhode Island, who hoped to turn a
section of shoreline into what the plaintiff described as a "beach
club." The United States Supreme Court addressed a number of
issues surrounding regulatory takings, but of greatest import to the
Virginia situation was the court's handling of timing in an inverse
condemnation claim.
Like the Virginia's Supreme Court in Omni Homes, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court, relying upon Lucas,41 firmly held that
once restrictive regulations were in effect, a landowner could not
acquire such encumbered property and subsequently claim a taking.42
The court held that, "when Palazzolo became the owner of this land
in 1978, state laws and regulations already substantially limited his
right to fill wetlands. Hence, the right to fill wetlands was not part of
the title he acquired. ' ' 3 Further, "he had no inherent development
rights derived from any rights that existed prior to his acquiring title
to the land in 1978.""
Upon appellate review, however, the United States Supreme
Court was unwilling to endorse the timing rationale adopted in
Virginia and Rhode Island. To many state court justices' surprise,
the Court held the converse:
Were we to accept [Rhode Island's] rule, the postenactment transfer of title would absolve the State
of its obligation to defend any action restricting
land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable.
A State would be allowed, in effect, to put an
expiration date on the Takings Clause. This ought
not to be the rule. Future generations, too, have a
right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the
use and value of land.45
The Court reasoned, "The State's rule would work a critical alteration
to the nature of property, as the newly regulated landowner is
4°533 U.S. 606 (2001).
41505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
42
43See Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2000).
1d. at 716.
44Id.at 717.

Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001).
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stripped of the ability to transfer the interest which was possessed
prior to the regulation. The State may not by this means secure a
windfall for itself.,,A6 In conclusion, the Court determined that "a
regulation that otherwise would be unconstitutional absent
compensation is not transformed into a background
'4 7 principle of the
State's law by mere virtue of the passage of title.
The difficulty associated with the ripeness of takings claims
occurring long after the enactment of the offending regulation was
also of import to the Court:
A challenge to the application of a land-use
regulation, by contrast, does not mature until
ripeness requirements have been satisfied, under
principles we have discussed; until this point an
inverse condemnation claim alleging a regulatory
It would be
taking cannot be maintained.
illogical, and unfair, to bar a regulatory takings
claim because of the post-enactment transfer of
ownership where the steps necessary to make the
claim ripe were not taken, or could not have been
taken, by a previous owner.48
Of note, in no other area of land-use regulation may such a
point be more salient. Forest landowners, managing on a rotational
basis, may defer harvesting timber on the property for ten, twenty, or
even fifty years after enactment of the regulation, and therefore lack
the necessary ripeness to press a claim against the government.
Additionally, it is quite likely that the property may be transferred
during that time period-a source of consternation for the Palazollo
Court.
As a result, the Omni Homes decision has been tacitly
jeopardized. The Supreme Court's interpretation of its own holding
in Lucas illustrates flaws in the Omni Homes decision, where the
Virginia Supreme Court held that purchase subsequent to regulation
bars a takings claim. According to Palazzalo, a landowner may
indeed challenge a preexisting regulation after acquisition of the
regulated real property.
Forest landowners stand to benefit from this holding. The
large volume of private forest ownership in Virginia is illustrated by
the following: average private forestland ownership is twenty-nine
acres, 49 is owned by nearly 440,000 landowners, 50 and includes 1.3
46Id. at 627.
47
d. at 629-30.
4
ld. at 628.
49

Thomas W. Birch, Private Forest-landOwners of the UnitedStates, 1994, USDA

J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.

[VOL. 17:1

million acres held in parcels of less than ten acres.5 Timber
production has been the most common management objective cited
for private ownership of timberlands.52 This fact was borne out in
1994 when seventy percent of the forested acres were owned by
persons with experience in harvesting timber, while a mere thirteen
percent of the forest
land was held by landowners never intending to
53
harvest timber.
The implications of the Omni Homes rule, as originally cast
are alarming for a forest ownership pattern of this type. With so
many small landowners, land dispositions and acquisitions can be
accomplished much quicker and more frequently than when land is
held in fewer, larger, more expensive, and/or contiguous parcels. The
number of landowners that may acquire property already subject to
local regulation is therefore increased. With the Palazzolo ruling,
however, landowners acquiring pre-regulated property, of the type in
Dail v. York County, may once again avail themselves of the inverse
condemnation remedy. Of course, only time will tell how Virginia
courts will digest Palazzolo.
PART III
The regulation of forestry practices, like many areas of
environmental regulation, can occur at a number of levels and in a
number of ways. Private forest landowners in Virginia are regulated
primarily via two mechanisms.
The first set of regulations occur at the state level. If the
national variety of state-level forest practice regulations were placed
on a continuum, with the complete absence of regulation at the right
and intensive regulation at the left, Virginia would be54 somewhere
near the center, representing a fairly balanced approach.
Such statewide forest practice regulations are administered by
the Virginia Department of Forestry, 55 and cover a range of
Premiere purposes among those
management requirements.
regulations are maintenance of water quality 56 and timber reservation
FOREST SERVICE. N.E. EXPERIMENTAL STATION, RESOURCES BULLETIN NE-134 (1996).
5

"Birch, supra note 8.
"Michael T. Thompson and Tony G. Johnson, A Forested Tract-Size Profile of
Virginia's NIPF Landowners, USDA FOREST SERVICE, RESEARCH PAPER SRS-1, S. RESEARCH
STATION (1996).
"Birch, supra note 9, at 5.

"Id. at 6.
54California, Oregon, and Washington are representative of states with
comprehensive and often onerous forest management acts, while Ohio, Kentucky, and Montana
are examples of states with relatively minimal regulation of private forest landowners.
55VA. CODE ANN., § 10.1-1181 etseq. (Michie 2001).
"Id. § 10.1-1181.1-.6.
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for regeneration purposes. 7 Unlike some states at the extreme left
end of the continuum, notably California and Oregon, Virginia has no
state-wide requirements for such things as aesthetic or visual design
of timber harvest units and logging road location, 58 tree retention and
harvest management requirements for wildlife habitat,5 9 nor oldgrowth tree preservation.60 By limiting its forest practice regulations
to relatively secure police power areas closely associated with
prevention of offsite public nuisance harms (water quality) and
relatively defensible public welfare goals (post-harvest tree
regeneration), Virginia has largely avoided the difficulties associated
with regulations that merely provide public benefits.6'
At the local level, however, a different situation exists.
County and local municipalities have regulated forest practices within
their respective jurisdictions in a variety of manners and intensities.
The nature of such local forest regulation contrasts with state level
regulation in several ways. First, the subject areas of regulation
differ greatly. The state largely regulates in the water quality and
reforestation areas. On the other hand, county and local regulations
address such areas as minimum acreage required to allow
harvesting, 62 buffer zones alongside residential areas 63 and certain
public highways, 64 mandatory pre-harvest plans,6 5 restrictions
6 7 on
clearcutting, 66 and mandatory bonds guaranteeing reforestation.
Second, local regulations differ in the intensity to which they
control areas already regulated by the state. For example, the
Virginia Department of Forestry's Best Management Practices68
(BMP) suggests a fifty-foot harvest restriction buffer near streams.

"Id. § 10.1-1162-67.
'HCAL. PUB RES. CODE § 4551.5 (2001); Z'Berg-Nejedly Forest Practices Act, CAL
CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 4, 4.5 (2000).
"!d.; WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09 (2000); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222 (2000).

6CAL CODE REGS, tit. 14, § 1038, 1104.1 (2001).
61
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, ch. 9 (1985); FREDERICK W. CUBBAGE ET
AL., FOREST62 RESOURCE POLICY 356-57 (1993); Warren supra note 12.
WARREN COUNTY, VA., ZONING ORDINANCE ch. 180 (2000); YORK COUNTY, VA.,
CODE § 24.1-419
(1997).
63
WARREN COUNTY, VA., ZONING ORDINANCE ch. 180 (2000).

"ISLE
65

OF WIGHT COUNTY, VA,, CODE § 4200 (1999).

MIDDLESEX COUNTY, VA., CODE, DRAGON RUN CONSERVATION DISTRICT (1995);

LOUDON COUNTY, VA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 4-1600 (1998); NEW KENT COUNTY, VA.,
ORDINANCE § 9.91 et seq. (2000); FAIRFAX COUNTY, VA., CODE ch. 118 (1999); FREDERICK
COUNTY, VA., CODE ch. 79 (1992); Epstein, supra note 6 1.
"WARREN COUNTY, VA., ZONING ORDINANCE ch. 190 (2000); YORK COUNTY, VA.
(1997); ISLE OF WIGHT COUNTY, VA., CODE § 4200 (1999).
CODE § 24.1-419
67
WARREN COUNTY, VA., ZONING ORDINANCE ch. 180 (2000); NEw KENT COUNTY,
VA., ORDINANCE § 9.91 et seq. (2000).
6
"VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY, FORESTRY BMP GUIDE FOR VIRGINIA

(1997). Best Management Practices (BMP) are designed to mitigate the addition of pollutants,
which in the case of forestry is sediment, from reaching a stream or other water body.
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All existing local regulations addressing riparian buffers exceed that
number,69 some buffers by as much as ten times.7 °
Local forest regulation is less desirable than regulation at the
state level for a variety of reasons. First, regulation on a county or
local level, at least in Virginia, has the potential for chaotic results,
particularly since forest landownership boundaries rarely follow
municipal boundaries. If each county in Virginia passed its own
forestry ordinance, this alone would result in ninety-five different sets
of county regulations, and forty more if followed by Virginia's
independent cities. Such an outcome cannot be labeled fatalistic
speculation. Already Virginia forest landowners are subject to
twenty-one differing sets of local forest management ordinances,7'
comprising seventy-seven individual forest management standards.72
State-level regulation, on the other hand, advances uniformity and
predictability, by establishing regulatory authority under one
government body. Presumably, this central decision-maker has the
resources, expertise, and experience to regulate forest management
practices.73 Such a central regulating body could harness the
expansion of arbitrary or ill-conceived local ordinances.
In an effort to address such problems, and to provide a predictable
regulatory environment for the forest resource community, the
Virginia General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 592. 74 This bill,
popularly known as the "Right to Forestry" bill, was signed into law
in 1997. 75 It generally preempted local regulation of forestry, or
silvicultural activities, if certain conditions were met. The law
specifically provided that:
Not withstanding any other provision of law,
silvicultural activity, as defined in §10.1-1181,
that is conducted in accordance with the
silvicultural best management practices developed
and enforced by the State Forester pursuant to
§ 10.1- 1105 and ... is located on property defined

as real estate devoted to forest use under §58.13230 or in a district established pursuant to
Chapter 43 (§15.2-4400 et seq.) of Title 15.2 shall
69

Of the six counties or cities requiring riparian buffers, all six exceed state

recommendations.
1

771 SLE OF WIGHT COUNTY, VA., CODE § 4200 (1999).
7

Spink, supra note 4.

1SOCIO-3, supra note 5.
7'Frederick W. Cubbage, Public Regulation of Private Forestry,89 J. FORESTRY 31,

34(1991).

74

SB. 592, 1997 Gen. Assem. (Va. 1997).
75Signed by the governor January 28, 1997, effective July 1, 1997.
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not be prohibited or unreasonably limited by a
local government's use of its police, planning and
zoning powers. Local ordinances and regulations
pertaining to such silvicultural activity shall be
reasonable and necessary to protect the health,
safety and welfare of citizens residing in the
locality.76
The state leveled the regulatory playing field to a great degree
by requiring the use of BMP as a means of ensuring a certain level of
stewardship and care on the part of forestry operators. By linking
regulation and quality forest practices, challenges based upon even
rigid interpretations of the takings doctrine would likely fail.
Moreover, by creating incentives for landowners and operators to

comply with BMP, the state used a carrot, rather than a stick, to foster
greater land management care when harvesting timber. The very real
fear of local regulation should have prompted even reluctant loggers
to consider adhering to state BMP standards. All this was for naught
however, for the Virginia Supreme Court was not convinced by the
state's attempt at forest regulation preemption.77
Before addressing the court's ruling, it is important to
understand the relationship between state police powers, takings, and

forestry regulations. There are some types of forest regulations that
are clearly legitimate exercises of police powers, since they are
designed to prevent what might otherwise be a common law nuisance
or other tort, or are clearly related to preventing an identifiable public
harm. 78 For example, laws that regulate sediment delivery to streams,
or require certain fire hazard mitigations are designed to protect not
only a resource, but the rights and properties of the public in
general.79

Other forms of forest regulation are less defensible. For
example, certain laws, such as those that require replanting (as
distinguished from regeneration) of harvested land, visual or aesthetic
76VIRGINIA CODE ANN. § 10.1-1126.1 (Michie 2001).
77See Dail v. York County, 528 S.E.2d 447, 451 (Va. 2000).
78
For example, Oregon adopted forest management regulations that prohibit timber
harvesting on certain high risk private lands to address dangerous mass failures (landslides).
The purpose of the regulations is as follows: "'The purpose of the shallow, rapidly moving
landslides and public safety rules is to reduce the risk of serious bodily injury or death caused
by shallow, rapidly moving landslides directly related to forest practices. These rules consider
the exposure of the public to these safety risks and include appropriate practices designed to
reduce the occurrence, timing, or effects of shallow, rapidly moving landslides." OR. ADMIN. R.
629-623-0000
79 (2001).
For example, Montana's Fire Hazard Reduction law requires that landowners
conducting timber-harvesting activities on their land provide.for the reduction of timber slash
within fixed time periods. The nexus with preventing off-site harm to the property and person
of other landowners is obvious.
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corridors, or retention of particular trees for wildlife habitat, clearly
do nothing to abate a nuisance or other offsite harm. As such, this
form of regulation, while arguably providing some public benefit,
does not prevent public harm. Thus, this latter form of regulation is
less likely to survive constitutional scrutiny. For example, the
Oregon Court of Appeals recently held that a state-wide harvesting
prohibition zone, around spotted-owl (a federal endangered species)
nests located on private land, provided the foundation for a regulatory
takings claim.81 The state reasserted principles found within Lucas,
namely that the harvesting regulation merely prevented a public
nuisance, and therefore, was immune to a takings claim. 2 The
Oregon Court of Appeals differed:
The state offers no authority for the proposition
that knocking down a bird's nest on one's
property has ever been considered a public
nuisance.83
It does not follow, as the state seems to posit, that
any act taken by the state to protectferae naturae
on private property is the equivalent to an
abatement of a public nuisance, or alternatively,
any act by a private party to destroyferae naturae
84
on private property constitutes a public nuisance.
However, the balance in analyzing the competing forces
between private and public goods remains elusive. 8 5 How far should
the regulation go, what scientific evidence exists for its enactment,
and does it indeed prevent a public nuisance? Virginia Senate Bill
592 was a cogent attempt at achieving that balance. It combined a
respect for private property with a desire to further resource
protection, giving a central authority
with expertise in the field the
86
task of acting as the sole regulator.
8OFor example, the California Board of Forestry and Fire Protection voted in 2001 to

require a timber harvest plan or an environmental assessment prior to harvesting any "oldgrowth" tree, and further, a pending 2002 California ballot initiative (SAOIRFOO40, Arndt. # IS) which would completely prohibit the harvesting of heritage or "old-growth" trees on private
property, bearing no relationship to the prevention of a definable public or private harm.
81
Boise Cascade v. Oregon, 991 P.2d 563 (Or. App. 1999), appeal denied, 18 P.3d
1099 (Or. 2000), cert denied 532 U.S. 923 (2001).

"Id.
at 569.
3

1d. at 570.
gId. at 571.
"FREDERICK
DEVELOPING

W.

CUBBAGE, THE PUBLIC

INTEREST

REGULATIONS AND INCENTIVES IN CREATING

CENTURY (Kathryn A. Kohm & Jerry F. Franklin, eds., 1997).
'See SB 592, 1997 Gen. Assem.(Va. 1997).

A

IN PRIVATE FORESTS:
FORESTRY FOR THE 21

2002-2003]

SCIENCE AND POLICY INVIRGINIA'S FORESTS

15

The various forms of local regulation that currently exist lack
such a defensible argument. As such, they are more likely to be
attacked by landowners claiming that the ordinances have damaged
or taken their property's value.8 7 The more draconian nature of these
local forest management laws, coupled with their inherent
vulnerability, may tend to create a difficult and expensive situation
for both landowners and local governments.
The merits of Senate Bill 592 were examined by the Virginia

Supreme Court, compounding the challenges directly associated with
the type of regulation and the form of the regulator in Dail v. York
County.88 The case came before the court based upon two joint
landowners' claim that the local regulation of their forested property
prevented them from harvesting timber as they desired. 89 The
specific facts are noteworthy, as they vividly illustrate some of the
problems posed by local regulation.
The landowners, Anne Dail and her son James, had intended
to harvest the timber located on her thirty-seven acre tract in York
County. 90 Aware of the passage of Senate Bill 592, the Dails notified
the county of their intention to harvest and their intention to rely upon
the language of the new law. 91 The county disagreed with the
application of Senate Bill 592, and ordered the Dails to cease any
operations pending resolution of the matter, or continue at risk of
censure. 92 The Dails argued at the trial level that they had complied
with the Virginia Code that exempted them from local regulations
should they follow BMP.93 The property in question had been zoned
R-R.94 Rural-residential and forestry activities were permitted by the
county without the need to apply for any special use permit in that
instance. In other areas, a permit would be required. 95
York County, however, had in place a forestry regulation governing
timber harvesting anywhere in the county 96 including property in R-R
zones. That regulation, one of the most rigorous of any in the
Commonwealth, 97 contained several substantive land management
"7See Paul V. Ellefson et al., State Forest Practice Regulatory Programs: An
Approach to Implementign Ecosystem Management in the United States, 21 ENVTL. MGMT.
421,429-30 (1997).

"s5
S.E.2d 447 (Va. 2000).
8 28
ld.
9
1d. at 448.
91
1d"

'5.1d"

91Id.
9'Rural-Residential.
5YORK COUNTy,VA., CODE § 24.1-419 (1997).
"Ild.

9State forester James Garner was quoted in 1998 as assessing the York County
forestry ordinance as one of the most restrictive forest ordinances in Virginia before the state
law took effect in 1997, and that even after 1997 the law "still ranks right up there in terms of
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requirements, as well as a procedural requirement for the
development of and compliance with a forest plan prior to any
harvest. 98 The substantive land management requirements included:
(1) a minimum of five acres required to conduct forestry operations; 99
(2) protection of all heritage, memorial, and specimen trees; 00 (3)
fifty foot no-harvest buffers along all public roads, and twenty-five
foot no-harvest buffers along all other sides of the property; 1 (4)
streamside management zones of at least 50 feet, 03in which harvesting
2
was limited;' 0 and (5) reforestation requirement. 1
Additionally, the Dail property was subject to both a
Watershed Management Area Overlay, 10 4 and an Environmental
Management Overlay. 0 5 These additional regulations prohibited
timber harvesting within 200 feet of a stream in the case of the
former, 0 60 and
prohibited clearcutting on private land in the case of
7
the latter.
Procedurally, the county required preparation and submission
of a forest management plan detailing: the geographic location of the
harvest site and the presence of any cultural, historical or
environmentally sensitive features; a narrative description of all
harvesting procedures; a reforestation plan; and a depiction of all
buffer zones108 The plan then required approval by the Virginia
Department of Forestry and the county zoning officer.t°9
Such requirements, however, inject arbitrary and even
unfounded hurdles into the permitting process. For example, the
Virginia Department of Forestry could be required by the county to
approve or disapprove forest management plans that may fail to
embody state-wide forestry requirements, and fail to encompass or
comply with the Department of Forestry's own watershed BMP.
Further, the regulation places a burden upon the landowner to garner
approval from a separate bureaucracy that itself possesses no organic
authority to require a forest management plan from the landowner."0
restriction."
G 14.

Battle Over Trees Cuts Both Ways, THE WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 18, 1998, at

9
8YoRK
99

COUNTY, VA., CODE § 24.1-419(b) - (c) (1997).
1d. at (a).
'IOld.at (e).
1011d. at (f).
'I21d. at (g).
1031d.
at (h), (i).
104YORK COUNTY, VA., CODE § 24.1-376 (1997).
0
'Id.
at § 24.1-372.
"Id. at (e).

107yORK, VA., COUNTY CODE § 24.1-419(e)(5) (1997).
0

'"Id.
9MId.

"0The Department of Forestry's general authority to regulate forestry activity in
Virginia is expressed in specific legislative delegations of statutory authority. Approvals or
disapproval of a forest management plan is not counted among the enumerated delegations and
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Additionally, the local zoning officer, who in many cases would be
untrained as a forester, would be scrutinizing a plan before approving
or disapproving it that required a scientific and expensive
environmental assessment and a detailed description of technical
timber harvesting methods and procedures. The zoning officer could
disapprove such a plan for the failure of the applicant to comply with
any part of the applicable regulations. Should that occur, harvesting
would be prohibited."'
defining
Finally, York County zoning ordinances
"development" as any land-disturbing activity have been interpreted
to include timber harvesting." 2 That interpretation, based upon a
county finding that timber harvesting changes the character of the
land, requires an impact assessment when such harvesting occurs in a
watershed management area in addition to the above-mentioned
requirements." 3 The assessment is not limited to analyzing timber
harvesting effects in the riparian buffer established by the watershed
management area, but includes the entirety of the harvest area as
well.'14 In other words, though the requirements of the watershed
management area substantively restrict timber harvesting only in the
riparian corridor, the assessment must nonetheless be prepared prior
to permitting harvesting on any of the contiguous parcels, regardless
of size and character. Among the requirements of the assessment is
an analysis of "how the reduction in tree canopy and the disturbance
to the under story will not cause the rate and quality of runoff to
exceed pre-development (pre-timbering) levels." '11
Practically, that cannot be accomplished, because timber
harvesting typically produces some effect on the rate and quality of
runoff. A change in rate or quality of flow, however, is not
synonymous with a harmful change, but York County makes no
distinctions. These requirements create a new substantive standard
and burden for landowners-one that may be scientifically and
Again, this is a clear
economically impossible to meet.
demonstration of the problems associated with the devolvement of
regulatory authority to local governments.
The Virginia Supreme Court, in piecing together this
fractured relationship between state and county forest regulations,
misapprehended the role of the county forest management plan.
While Virginia Senate Bill 592 clearly prohibited timber-permitting
requirements of the Department.
'YORK COUNTY, VA., CODE § 24.1419(b) (1997).
"2Letter from J.Mark Carter, York County Zoning Administrator, to William Day
(on file with the authors).
(November 9,2001)
131d.
1141d.
11I51d.
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requirements by counties," 6 the court determined that the county's
management plan approval requirement failed to constitute such a
prohibited "permit:"
Allowing proposed activity to be reviewed for
compliance implies that the review process
encompasses more than simply a review of a
proposed plan of activity. The statutory review
process includes a component of evaluation and
decision regarding compliance. Describing this
decision as an "approval" in the Forestry
Ordinance is consistent with authorizing the
zoning administrator to make such a determination
a
regarding compliance,
7 and does not create
permit requirement."
Perhaps the court should have simply consulted MerriamWebster, wherein "permit" is defined as "a written warrant or license
granted by one having authority."" 8 Even a common understanding
of the term "permit" demands the logical conclusion that an
application to a body of authority for approval or disapproval is an
inherent component. The approval of the application, which is
legally required to carry out a proposed and regulated activity, is a
Only judicial prestidigitation or a
permitting arrangement.
preoccupation with form over substance could account for the
contrary outcome.
Further, in the natural resource management field, it is
exceedingly common for an applicant, seeking authority for some
activity, be it mining, logging, or other, to submit a prepared
application to a governmental regulatory body for approval or
disapproval of the management activity. The Dail court's decision
appears to be premised on the notion that a permit implies merely
notice filing or the rote approval of an application. The court must
also have determined that an application coupled with something
'other than rote review and approval is not a permit. This interesting,
but hardly well reasoned, dichotomy does not seem sufficient to
evade what the legislature clearly intended to prohibit-local
governance of forestry operations.
Nonetheless, in Dail, the court held that the application
approval process was not a permit, and therefore did not violate the
state law. The Dails raised other challenges, including the
6

" VA.CODE ANN, § 10.1-1126.1(B) (Michie 2001).
"Dail v. York County, 528 S.E.2d 447, 450 (Va. 2000).
"'MERRIAN-WEBSTER, http://www.m-w.com.
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clearcutting prohibition in the Environmental Management Overlay
Ordinance.'
Again, the court, unfamiliar with much of the subject
matter into which it waded, found that complete prohibition of a
silvicultural activity did not violate state law, stating that a county
may not "prohibit or unreasonably limit" silvicultural activity. 20 The
court did not investigate the definition of silvicultural activity in the
state law, wherein it states:
any
forest
activity
means
Silvicultural
management activity, including but not limited to
the harvesting of timber, the construction of roads
and trails for forest management purposes, and the
preparation of property for reforestation.' 2 1
Nor did the court consult the Dictionary of Forestry, which though
not containing a definition of "silvicultural activity," defines
"silvicultural system" as:
A planned series of treatments for tending,
harvesting, and re-establishing a stand-note the
system name is based upon the number of age
classes (coppice, even-aged, two-aged, un-evenaged) or the regeneration method (clearcutting,
seed tree, shelterwood,
22 selection, coppice, coppice
with reserves) used. 1
The court's misapprehension of the intent and meaning of the
state law consequently ratified York County's efforts to do exactly
what the state had intended to prevent. By finding that the county
regulation banning clearcutting was a "limitation," rather than a
"prohibition," the court ignored the plain fact that York County
prohibited clearcutting.' 23 The ordinance does not merely establish
restrictions or limitations on that particular silvicultural technique-it
The textual caveat that the zoning
outlaws its use entirely.
administrator may allow "selected thinning"'1 4 is irrelevant. Selected
thinning is not synonymous with clearcutting, and though perhaps
appearing to prevent an outright ban, fails to do so with sufficient
technical language.

""
0 Dail,528 S.E.2d at 45 1.
12VA. CODE ANN. § 10. 11181 (2001).

121
VA. CODE ANN. § 10. 1-1126.1 (2001).
22

' THE SOCIETY OF AMERICAN FORESTERS, THE DICTIONARY OF FORESTRY 167

(John A. Helms, ed., 1998) (emphasis added).
23
' Dail, 528 S.E.2d at 451; see also YORK COUNTY, VA., CODE § 24.1-376 (1997).
124YORK COUNTY, VA., CODE § 24.1-376 (1997).
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Finally, the Dails claimed the visual buffer requirements of
the county regulation conflicted with state law, and therefore, were
invalid. 12 5 This represented perhaps the weakest argument offered by
the Dails, but perhaps in other scenarios, represents the most effective
argument in the context of a regulatory taking claim. A buffer strip
preventing no nuisance-type harm to the public would likely lack
constitutional merit to stand, While several other buffer requirements
were in fact linked to water quality, the visual buffers challenged
were merely aesthetic in nature, and served no anti-nuisance purpose
at common law. For instance, if a landowner cut all the trees on his
property, no remedy would exist at common law for his neighbor to
oppose the cutting or claim scenic damages. If trees on the
neighbor's property were more susceptible to fire, insect infestation,
or wind damage due to the harvest, then such a regulation might be
legitimate. 26 There is no evidence, however, that the York County
regulation was designed or rationally related to those latter goals.
Be that as it may, Dail did not raise a regulatory takings
claim, and thus the court lacked the opportunity to address that issue.
In this decision, the Virginia Supreme Court reinforced the ability of
local counties and municipalities to continue regulating forestry
activities. Predictably, the Virginia Association of Counties has
advocated greater authority and autonomy in the regulation of forest
27
management activities, including broader permitting requirements
But what was the fate of the Dail property? What effects did
the York County Regulations have on forestry management? The
regulations imposed upon the property can effectively be broken into
the two categories discussed earlier: those that typify an exercise of
police powers, and those that merely provide public benefits at
private expense. Forestry regulations that indeed serve a commonlaw, anti-nuisance purpose represent a valid exercise of police
28
powers, and would avoid taking or damage claims like the Dail's.
A streamside management zone buffer, if rationally designed to
ensure water quality for downstream watershed users, is such an
example. Designed to prevent actionable, off-site harms to other
property owners, it would likely satisfy a common law anti-nuisance
test.
The other buffer requirements are another matter. It is
inconceivable how an argument might be fashioned that a visual
buffer was in any way preventing off-site tortious harms to other
25

Dail, 528 S.E.2d at 585-87.

126See Boise Cascade v. Oregon, 991 P.2d 563 (Or. App. 1999), appeal denied, 18
P.3d 1099 (Or. 2000), cert denied 532 U.S. 923 (2001).
'VIRGINIA ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES, supra note 6.
8
12EPSTEIN, supra note 61, at 107-25.
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residents. During the legal dispute in Dail, the York County
Attorney argued that the law at issue was legal, reasonable and
designed to address safety issues as well as aesthetic and
environmental issues. 129 While that legal position was necessary to
justify the county's ordinances, the substantive merits of the
statement are questionable, and tend to confirm the fifty-year-old
fears of the dissenting justice in State v. Dexter:
The development of the doctrine of the "the police
power" has passed all constitutional barriers, so
that now all that is necessary to introduce and
enforce any repressive measure is to use a highsounding, plausible preamble, and the courts will
then approve, regardless of the fact that
personal
130
liberties are taken from the individual.
The regulations cannot conveniently be lumped into one
mass. Although the York County Attorney may have been quite
accurate in his appraisal of the streamside management zone
regulation, he offered inadequate justification for the visual buffer.
The James City County Development Manager was quoted as glibly
noting that "[f]ogging can cause erosion, make a property less
attractive for development and even cause small but distinct climate
changes by robbing an area of shade," in order to justify the York
County regulations.' 3 ' Unfortunately, such a shallow characterization
is akin to our forestry forebearers' claims of nearly a century ago that
cutting trees reduced rainfall. 132 The city manager's remarks are of
dubious scientific merit, lack a totality of context, and more
importantly, bear no relationship to the private property principles at
stake.
The visual buffer, designed to provide an aesthetic service to
the community at large, affected nearly ten percent of the Dail
property. 133 This ten-percent reduction in harvestable acreage carried
an equivalent timber value of $6,642 for the owners. 134 While the
regulation by no means diminished the entire value of the parcel, it is
important to note that stumpage values received by Virginia's
landowners have ripple effects within the Virginia economy. In this
29

' Battle Over Trees Cuts Both Ways, THE WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1998, at G14.

'EState v. Dexter, 202 P.2d 906, 912 (Wash. 1949) (Simpson, J., dissenting).

3'Battle Over Trees Cuts Both Ways, supra note 129.

"2 See generally, SAMUEL T.

DANA & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE

POLICY 41 (2d. ed. 1980) (1956).
'3Memorandum from Jess Crawford, Consulting Forester, to Michael Mortimer
(Jan. 7, 2002) (on file with authors).
1341d.
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case, the value of stumpage the Dails were prohibited from
harvesting would have a value-added worth of $235,126.135 While
those few travelers passing by the Dails' rural property may have
received some intangible aesthetic benefit from the presence of a tree
buffer obscuring the signs of timber harvesting, the economic
impacts, both to the Dails and to the larger Virginia economy, dwarf
that esoteric sum.
Where are Virginia's forest regulations post-Dail? As stated
above, they are in flux. Though Virginia has in place what appear to
be adequate regulations to prevent watershed degradation and to
ensure adequate reforestation, the door has been opened for the
creation of local forestry regulations in any imaginable form.
Legislation introduced in Virginia's 2002 Session sought to capitalize
on this situation, 36 threatening to create far more policy problems
than it might ever resolve.
PART IV
Apart from the immediate legal and economic implications
for forest landowners provided by the remedies of inverse
condemnation and Article I damage claims, forest regulation presents
larger policy implications for Virginia's forests and forest
landowners.
Forest regulation, by making the retention and
management of forested land less profitable, 37 creates a situation
where forest landowners will often consider alternative uses and
management schemes for the property.138 Faced with daunting forest
regulation, it is the rare landowner who will resign himself or herself
to maintaining the property in a forested, though unmanaged
condition. Additionally, one would expect a chilling effect on new
investment for timber management purposes with such regulated
private forested land.
It is easy to predict the outcome-relatively large contiguous
blocks of forestland risk conversion to residential developments,
commercial facilities, or other non-forest land uses.
Land
conversion, of course, is a familiar phenomenon and not necessarily a
harbinger of a particular problem. In this case, however, it has been
5

(1997).

13See VA. DEPT. OF FORESTRY, VIRGINIA'S FORESTS: OUR COMMONWEALTH
This figure is based upon calculations performed by the Virginia Department of

Forestry in its 1997 report, but updated for the Department's pending report. See Virginia
ForestFacts.
36 at http://www.dof.state.va.usresinfo/facts.htm.
1 H.D. 791, 2002 Sess. (Va. 2002) (amending and reenacting 10.1-1126.1 of the
Code of Virginia,
relating to harvesting timber in urban areas),
37
I See VA. DEPT. OF FORESTRY, VIRGINIA'S FORESTS: OUR COMMONWEALTH
(1997).
3
. .SOCIO-3, supra note 5.
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established that the single most serious and enduring risk to forests
and forest habitat in the southern United States is the urbanization of
forested land. 39 The proliferation of local forestry regulations has
been identified as a contributing factor to that urbanization.' 40 In that
context, the risks and problems posed by loss of Virginia's forestland
must in part be attributed to the structure of incentives and
regulations faced by private forest landowners. For example, one
need only turn again to the situation in York County. It possesses
one of the more rigorous local forest management ordinances in the
Commonwealth. 141
York County is also geographically located in one of the areas
identified as at the highest risk for the loss of forest cover due to
urbanization. 42
Nonetheless, the county has chosen to end
preferential tax treatment previously afforded forest landowners. The
carrot is missing, and the stick is all that remains.13 Loss of
incentive for landowners to maintain a forested condition, coupled
with aggressive land-use regulation, begs the question: what is the
intent of York County regarding forested land? York County's
comprehensive policy of forestland retention appears flawed at best,
and negligent at worst. The various pieces together create a hostile
environment for both the retention and recruitment of forest cover.
This is an undesirable result for York County and other urbanizing
counties and likely will result in loss of both economic and
environmental amenities provided by York County forests. Timber
harvesting alone returns in excess of $400,000 annually to county
landowners, 144 and it represents
$14,729,267 in value added to the
45
Virginia economy at large.1
As mentioned earlier, the United States Forest Service has
recently released a report detailing the status of private forestland in
the southern United States.' 46 While part of that report assessed
47
forest regulations and the potential impact of those regulations,
39

1401d. at Summary.
1 1d.
4
1 'Battle Over Trees Cuts Both Ways, supra note 129.
42
1 U.S. FOREST SERVICE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
SOUTHERN FOREST
RESOURCE ASSESSMENT, SOCIO-1, § 5 (2001).
43

1 York County previously afforded agricultural, horticultural and forest landowners

the opportunity for real property tax relief. See VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-3230 et seq. Tax
structure is recognized as a key incentive for promoting forest landowners to keep their lands in
forest, rather than other uses. Id.; U.S. FOREST SERVICE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, SOUTHERN FOREST RESOURCE ASSESSMENT at SOCIO-4.
'VIRGINIA DEPT. OF FORESTRY, 1998-1999 VIRGINIA COUNTY HARVEST VOLUME
AND VALUE.
45
VA. DEPT. OF FORESTRY, VIRGINIA'S FORESTS: OUR COMMONWEALTH (1997);
Memorandum from Jess Crawford, Consulting Forester, to Michael Mortimer (Jan. 7, 2002).
46
' U.S. FOREST SERVICE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
SOUTHERN FOREST RESOURCE ASSESSMENT (2001).
47
. 1d. at SOCIO-3.
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another assessed the largest threats to forest cover and identified
geographically those regions most susceptible to the loss of forest
cover 148 The report identified, among others, the coastal Virginia
region encompassing York County. This finding should be expected,
49
as York County is one of the fastest growing regions of Virginia,1
and the sixth most densely populated county in the state. 5 Finally,
nearly two thirds of the remaining forests in York County are
currently on public land, 151 thus prioritizing the need for careful
consideration of the fate of private forestland within both the county
and the region.
What is surprising is the apparent disconnect between the
policy steps taken in an effort to ensure the retention of forest cover
and the actual effects of those steps.' 5 It is, however, easy to
understand the problem. Forest management and policy, like any
other scientific endeavor, requires technical knowledge and skill.'
County and city bureaucracies seldom possess adequate budgets to
address exigent urban forestry concerns such as hazard trees and
power line pruning, let alone the staff and budget required to
comprehensively address regional forest and timber concerns. That
task is best left to centralized organizations capable of looking at the
larger picture, such as state-level
54 agencies and universities, whose job
it is to address such problems. 1
Since the transfer of forested property remains unfettered,
while residential and commercial pressures are increasing, forested
land that is unable to be economically managed will be converted to
another use. With population densities near 530 persons per square
mile,' 55 the continued likelihood of commercial timber management
in York County is nearly zero.1 56 This problem is compounded by
the York County ordinance which may intend to preserve some
semblance of forest cover. The result is perversely the opposite.

Mid. at SOCIO-I.
'CHARTING THE COURSE TO 2015, THE YORK COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 6
(adopted Oct.0 6, 1999).
" Id.
"'5See Va. Dept. of Forestry,at http://www.state.vipnet.org/dof/R2/york.htm.
5'This is particularly ironic considering one of York County's planning goals is to
"retain natural physical features, forests, and woodland areas throughout the development
process." See CHARTING THE COURSE TO 2015, THE YORK COUNTY COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 41
(adopted Oct. 6, 1999).
"3SOCIETY OF AMERICAN FORESTERS, PUBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVATE FOREST
PRACTICES, A POSITION OF THE SOCIETY OF AMERICAN FORESTERS (2002).
"5ald.

" U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICK FACTS, YORK COUNTY, VA.
(2000), at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/51/51199.html.
"56David N. Wear, et al., The Effects of Population Growth on Timber Management
and Inventories in Virginia, 118 FOREST ECOLOGY AND MGMT. 107 (1999).
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Short of forbidding the conversion of forested land to any
other use, localities like York County must understand the
ramifications of their regulatory schemes. At the state level, policymakers must be aware of the effect of county regulations on the
forests that the public claims to revere and its representatives seek to
preserve. The inability to sustain forest cover and forest management
may lead to fragmented wildlife habitats, difficulty in managing
existing forest fuel loads, and increased difficulty in fighting forest
fires. 157
Lest this article be accused of simply being a diatribe
opposing forest regulation in any form, let us offer two caveats to the
arguments herein. First, this article presents something other than
simply a repackaging of the much-heralded cry of the "zoning
oppressed." The Dait case and the broader local forest regulation
difficulties in Virginia are not about zoning. In fact, the actions
proposed by the Dails were in compliance with the zoning type in
which their land was located. This discussion is primarily concerned
with the deliberate and focused land use regulation of a particular
class of landowners, targeted only because of the nature of the
property they own, which is merely touching tangentially on planning
or zoning. It is imperative that policy-makers understand not only
what such ordinances intend to accomplish, but also the means and
mechanism established
to do so and the potential for unintended
58
consequences.'
Neither does this discussion urge a blanket end to forest
regulation, prompting a forestry "race to the bottom" as timber
investors flock to the wild, lawless forests of Virginia. Rather, this
article demands that forest regulations be thoughtful, effective, and
mindful of the property rights they will undoubtedly confront.
Finally, any argument for uniform state regulation in this
article has analogs throughout the law. Why else would Congress
exercise its considerable power under the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution if not to prevent provincial regulatory
impediments to the flow of commerce, ostensibly passed by
individual jurisdictions, with the safety and welfare of the people of
each state in mind? It is easy to see parallels to the situation in
Virginia where the forest industry is integral to the state economy.

1571d.

"'SOCIETY OF AMERICAN FORESTERS, supra note 153.
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CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court's ruling in Palazzolo
should prompt changes in the manner in which inverse condemnation
claims are addressed in Virginia. This change may provide forested
landowners and others with new opportunities to challenge the body
of local forestry regulations that have arisen. In turn, this change
may create a greater awareness of the problems generated by local
forest regulation and suggest policy changes necessary to prevent
losses to landowners' rights, the Virginia economy, and lastly, to the
forestlands and forest-related values of the Commonwealth.

Regulation of forest practices represents a complex
relationship among science and policy, lawmaker and court. Where
feasible, such decisions are best relegated to the combination of forest
professional, and comprehensive, constitutional regulatory schemes.
For if not, the resultant land use conflicts and environmental
outcomes may not be what any participant would have.
The Virginia Department of Forestry noted of York County
that:
Much of York County now faces the challenge of
caring for trees in an urban environment, however
traditional forestry for timber production is still
being carried out in areas of western York County
and on some of the governmental land holdings.
A healthy forest resource either rural or urban will
return investment costs many times over and in
many different ways. With proper management
and conservation the forests of York County can
remain a renewable and sustainable resource for
the residents of York 59County and the
Commonwealth of Virginia.1
York County, however, appears to have charted a course of
neither proper management nor conservation of its forest resources.
The future will demonstrate whether Virginia's constitutional
guarantees and the holding in Palazzolo will serve to correct that
course.

1S

Va. Dept. of ForestryData, supra note 151.

